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This paper analyzes the bright and dark sides of the 
financial development process through the lenses of the 
four fundamental frictions to which agents are exposed—
information asymmetry, enforcement, collective action, 
and collective cognition. Financial development is shaped 
by the efforts of market participants to grind down or 
circumvent these frictions, a process further spurred 
by financial innovation and scale and network effects. 
The analysis leads to broad predictions regarding the 
sequencing and convexity of the dynamic paths for a 
battery of financial development indicators. The method 
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used also yields a robust way to benchmark the financial 
development paths followed by individual countries 
or regions. The paper explores the reasons for path 
deviations and gaps relative to the benchmark. Demand-
related effects (past output growth), financial crashes, 
and supply-related effects (the quality of the enabling 
environment) all play an important role. Informational 
frictions are easier to overcome than contractual frictions, 
not least because of the transferability of financial 
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  What shapes the process of financial development (FD) and how predictable is it? Does it 
follow a single path or multiple paths? What are the sequences and shapes of the development 
paths followed by various FD indicators? Remarkably, the literature (particularly empirical) on 
these issues is relatively thin. The proposition that financial structure is shaped by the efforts of 
market participants to circumvent and reduce the frictions that hinder financial contracting is of 
course a familiar one.
2 Yet, few papers have attempted to analyze these frictions systematically 
in terms of the way they interact and what this may imply for the dynamics of FD. Interestingly, 
more work has been done on measuring the impact of FD on economic growth than on exploring 
how FD is affected by economic growth.
3 And when discussing the impact of financial structure 
on growth, the literature, at least until very recently, generally concluded that function matters 
more than form.
4 FD has been typically understood as a relatively smooth and predictable march 
from “relationship-based finance” to “arms-length finance” involving a systematic process of 
market completion driven by a gradual reduction of agency frictions.
5 However, the global 
financial crisis showed that FD has a “dark side” that can make it both non-linear and bumpy. 
Thus, what may appear as FD progress can in fact exacerbate market failures, thereby 
undermining financial sustainability.  
 
  Using a conceptual framework based on a typology of the frictions that hinder financial 
contracting, this paper explores and explains some of the patterns and paths of FD and discusses 
some of its maladies. Following work by de la Torre and Ize (2010, 2011), the paper first 
separates the frictions into agency frictions, which restrict the scope for delegation, and 
collective frictions, which restrict the scope for pooling and participation. Each of these two 
classes of frictions is in turn broken down into two paradigms, depending on the completeness of 
information and the extent of rationality. Thus, the two agency paradigms are costly enforcement 
(CE) and asymmetric information (AI); the two collective paradigms are collective action (CA) 
and collective cognition (CC).  
 
  Financial structure reflects economic agents’ efforts to find the path of least resistance 
around these four classes of frictions and paradigms. In turn, FD (the evolution of financial 
structure over time) reflects the gradual erosion of frictions, quickened by innovation, returns to 
scale, and network effects. The paper also identifies ways in which the same gradual easing of 
frictions that underlies the “bright side” of FD helps breed the tensions and fault lines that will 
eventually burst into the open in the form of financial crises (the “dark side” of FD).  
 
                                                 
2  See for example Merton and Bodie (2004). 
3  See for example Beck and Levine (2005). 
4 See Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) or Allen and Gale (2000). More recent papers (such as Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Feyen, and Levine, 2011) have come closer to recognizing that banks and markets play different roles at different 
stages of economic development, that is, that form might also matter. 
5 An earlier strand of thought viewed financial development as driven by the steady mitigation of asymmetric 
information failures such as moral hazard and adverse selection (see, for instance, Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; and 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). A more recent strand has emphasized enforcement costs and lack of collateral leading to 
problems of limited pledgeability (see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; and Geanakoplos, 2009). Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) present a more complete narrative rooted in the same basic threads. 3 
 
  From this construct emerges the basic proposition that the order of appearance of 
financial activities, which should reflect the intensity of the frictions to which they are exposed, 
should correlate with scale effects and the shape (convexity or concavity) of the development 
paths. Based on cross-section development paths (derived from an econometric exercise that 
averages countries’ financial development over a thirty-year time span for a large set of FD 
indicators), the paper finds that—except for some notable outliers whose deviant behavior is in 
itself quite informative—these patterns are, indeed, broadly verified. In particular, public debt, 
banking, and capital markets develop sequentially and under increasingly convex paths. 
However, the paper also finds that the dynamic development paths followed by specific country 
groups can deviate substantially from the cross-section paths. This may reflect country-specific 
development policies, path dependence, innovation-induced leapfrogging, cycles and crashes, or 
quantum jumps in financial development past some level of income.  
 
   The paper then explores possible reasons underlying the gaps in FD that emerge relative 
to the benchmarks obtained from the cross-section paths. It concludes that financial instability, in 
the form of financial crashes rather than simple financial volatility, can account for large and 
lasting gaps, particularly as regards private credit depth and bank margins. Demand effects, as 
proxied by past output growth, can also account for substantial cross-country differentials in 
financial depth. On the supply side, enabling environment factors such as enforcement costs, and 
creditor or property rights also play an important role, albeit on average somewhat more limited 
than stability or demand effects. This analysis also leads to useful insights as regards the order 
and relative ease with which frictions are overcome. In particular, we find that information 
frictions appear early but are easier to overcome than contractual frictions. While the former are 
mostly technological and can be easily imported, the latter mostly reflect collective action 
frictions that are strictly home-based, hence trickier to resolve.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual 
framework, first from the bright side, then the dark side. Section 3 applies this framework to the 
empirics of FD, considering first the cross-section patterns, then the dynamic paths. Section 4 
explores the factors behind the developmental gaps. Section 5 concludes by underlining some of 
the caveats and limitations of our empirical analysis and flagging key policy issues and 
challenges looking forward.  
 
2.  The analytics of financial development 
 
  a.  The bright side 
 
Financial development is all about the gradual grinding down (or circumvention) of the 
frictions that hinder financial contracting. If we lived in a frictionless Arrow-Debreu world of 
complete markets, risks would be fully and efficiently internalized in the price system, suppliers 
of funds or insurance would deal directly in the market with the users of funds or insurance, and 
neither of them would have a use for financial service providers. In the real world, however, 
frictions make markets and the ability to contract incomplete and imperfect, thereby opening a 
wide scope for the financial system to add value to society.       
 4 
 
  Two basic classes of frictions hinder financial transactions—agency frictions and 
collective frictions. Each class can, in turn, be subdivided into two categories: one relates to 
informational frictions, which relate to agents’ limited capacity to obtain or understand 
information; another relates to what we can loosely define as relational frictions, that is, agents’ 
capacity to agree and to act upon collectively beneficial financial arrangements, on the one hand, 
and to their capacity to enforce bilateral contracts, on the other (Table 1). This typology 
underpins four paradigms, two of which—asymmetric information (AI) and costly enforcement 
(CE)—are associated with agency frictions, and the other two—collective action (CA) and 
collective cognition (CC)—with collective frictions. The four paradigms can be associated with 
the different stages a financial contract goes through, from preparing the contract to negotiating 
and enforcing it (Table 1).
6 
 
Agency frictions hinder FD because they limit the capacity of individuals to delegate and 
contract bilaterally. Asymmetric information frictions lead to a misalignment of incentives 
between the “principal” and the “agent”—the agent can use his informational advantage to act in 
ways that are not in the interest of the principal. This, in turn, can trigger the commonly known 
market failures of adverse selection, moral hazard and shirking, and false reporting. Information 
asymmetry frictions limit financial contracts to those where agents have their own resources at 
risk (“skin in the game”) and/or where the principal can adequately screen and monitor the agent. 
Enforcement frictions also lead to a misalignment of incentives between the “principal” and the 
“agent,” but in this case due to imperfect pledgeability—a situation where the agent is unable to 
credibly commit to honor the contract. Imperfect pledgeability thus restricts financial contracts to 
those that can be effectively collateralized. 
 
Collective frictions, on the other hand, hinder FD because they constrain participation. 
“Participation” is understood throughout this paper as akin to, but with a more general meaning 
than, the traditional definition of “financial inclusion.” Participation can increase both along the 
intensive margin—the same players engaged in more financial transactions—and the extensive 
margin—more players entering into financial transactions. Much of the gains from financial 
activity relate to the reduction in transaction costs and the increase in liquidity and risk 
diversification benefits that result from arrangements in which many agents participate. Such 
arrangements can take the form of markets, where transactions can be conducted around a simple 
trading platform, or financial institutions (a bank, an insurance company, a mutual fund) that 
offer services whose benefits are pooled across a large number of customers. Network effects are 
central to this process. The higher the number of participants, the higher the benefits of 
participation. However, participation is hindered by cognition frictions—one does not participate 
in an activity that is not well understood—as well as collective action frictions, which typically 
restrict the setting up and operation of multilateral pooling arrangements.
7 
 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the paradigms, see de la Torre and Ize (2010, 2011). 
7 The collective action frictions of the bright side involve uninternalized positive externalities and coordination 
failures that prevent agents from moving to a superior equilibrium where everybody would be better off. The 
collective action frictions of the dark side (discussed below) involve uninternalized negative externalities, free 
riding, or coordination failures that prevent agents from avoiding falling into an equilibrium that is worse for the 
group as a whole, albeit possibly better for some.  5 
 
Market participants who wish to engage in financial contracting must, therefore, find the 
path of least resistance around these frictions and the associated market failures. Once a decision 
is made to participate in financial contracts, the private responses to coping with frictions can be 
divided into two subsets: responses aimed at lessening the frictions themselves (acquiring 
information, using collateral, delegating) and responses aimed at lessening the exposure to these 
frictions (diversifying and pooling risk, buying insurance and hedges, staying liquid). In turn, the 
state seeks to facilitate these private responses through a set of progressively more intrusive 
public interventions: (i) the provision of a basic contractual and informational infrastructure that 
facilitates private bilateral contracting; (ii) the regulation and taxation needed to internalize 
externalities or protect consumers; (iii) coordination arrangements that facilitate participation 
(catalytic involvement, systemic lending of last resort, government guarantees); and (iv) the 
direct provision by the state of financial services (possibly in competition with those offered by 
the private sector).      
 
Different components of the financial system help deal with frictions in different ways. 
Consider, for example, the need for information: capital markets provide price signals and 
motivate the supply of hard, public information by borrowing firms; instead, banks fill the 
information gap by generating proprietary information; fund managers do so by monitoring 
marketable assets; and market facilitators (auditors, rating agencies, and credit bureaus) 
contribute by selling specialized information and analysis. As another example, take the need for 
risk reduction through diversification: capital markets allow investors to diversify by buying 
assets with different risk profiles; instead, banks, insurance companies, and asset managers 
provide diversification through pooling. Finally, take the need for liquidity: capital markets 
provide the liquidity that allows participants to unwind assets at limited cost; instead, banks offer 
deposits that can be redeemed on demand and at par.   
 
Financial structure is thus a snapshot, at a given point in time, of the actual constellation 
of financial services aimed at coping with frictions.
8  Financial development is, in turn, the 
evolution of financial structure over time. An early resolution of collective action frictions 
(including through the introduction of central banks) sets the stage by allowing for basic payment 
and custody services. Once this is done, financial markets start resolving agency frictions by 
relying on non-tradable and immovable collateral and connections, that is, on relationship-based 
transactions. As the informational and contractual environment improves, private information 
becomes public and other types of collateral become available and tradable, gradually allowing 
FD to break free from the tyranny of connections. Similarly, as information becomes more 
abundant and governance arrangements improve, monitoring costs come down and monitoring 
can increasingly rely on third parties (rating agencies, market analysts, investment advisors, 
external auditors), statistical methods (scoring systems, value-at-risk calculations), and 
accounting and disclosure standards. 
 
                                                 
8 The shape and nature of financial structure is given by the mix (that is, relative weights and composition) and 
degree of sophistication of markets and products (debt, equity, derivatives), leveraged intermediaries (commercial 
banks, investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, dealers), non-leveraged asset managers (brokers, 
mutual funds, pension funds), and facilitators (accounting & auditing firms, rating agencies, investment consultants, 
mortgage originators, etc.). 6 
 
The gradual easing of agency frictions helps boosts participation. In turn, by unleashing 
positive network and scale externalities, the benefits of participation (liquidity, efficiency, etc.) 
become self-reinforcing. Thus, in the more mature phase of FD, there is a quantum leap in 
participation, as more clients, players, and transactions make markets increasingly deep, dense, 
and interconnected. The rising participation also increases the degree to which financial 
institutions and capital markets complement each other. The whole process is quickened by 
financial innovation, a major driver of FD that reflects and channels the forces of competition, 




The gradual easing of finance frictions depicted above provides broad pointers about the 
order in which various financial activities are likely to emerge, and the shape of the paths they 
are likely to follow once they emerge. The order of appearance of financial activities should 
reflect the intensity of the frictions to which they are exposed. The activities that are the least 
prone to (agency or collective action) frictions should emerge and develop first. On the other 
hand, those activities that are strongly inhibited by collective action frictions should appear later. 
However, once a critical mass is reached and they start to develop, rising participation should 
trigger increasingly important positive network externalities that further boost their development. 
We would thus expect those activities to be also the ones that have the most explosive (convex) 
development paths. Since activities that exhibit the highest returns to scale should generally be 
the ones exposed to the highest collective frictions, scale effects should correlate with the order 
in which financial activities appear and the shape (convexity or concavity) of their development 
path.
10 As we will see below, these basic patterns are broadly verified. However, before shifting 
from analytics to empirics, consider first the dark side of the finance frictions. 
 
b.  The dark side 
 
There are two types of finance maladies (that is, failures to complete markets and achieve 
efficient equilibria). The first one refers to the inability to resolve the agency frictions or 
collective (participation) frictions that hinder FD. Failures to reduce agency frictions continue to 
dominate the FD literature. They may occur at the level of the investor (reflecting his inability to 
monitor or lack of interest in doing so), at the level of the borrower (reflecting problems of 
                                                 
9 Indeed, the history of FD is marked by major waves of innovation. Consider, for instance, the role in the 
exponential ascent of finance in the western world stemming from the invention of Italian banking (based on trade-
related bills of exchange) by the Medici in the late XIV century; or the introduction of payments systems based on 
checking accounts, fractional reserve banking, and central banking during the XVII century; or the development of 
the government bond market, its seeds already visible in the late middle ages; or the invention of the joint-stock, 
limited liability company in the early XVII century and the associated mushrooming of stock exchanges; or the 
emergence of marine insurance and life insurance in the second half of the XVII century; or, in the latter part of the 
XX century, the development of securitization and derivative products. For an insightful and entertaining rendition 
of the history of finance in the western world, see Ferguson (2008). For a recently updated review of the roots and 
dynamics of financial innovation, see Lerner and Tufano (2011). On the role of competition and deregulation in FD, 
see Rajan and Zingales (2003). Examples of theoretical and methodological breakthroughs that have dramatically 
influenced FD include double-entry bookkeeping, probability theory, life expectancy tables and actuarial science, 
and the Black-Scholes option theory. 
10 The pattern can also be broadly corroborated through comparative historical studies. See, for instance, Ferguson 
(2008) and Rajan and Zingales (2003). 7 
 
governance), or somewhere in between (reflecting problems of incentives and “skin in the game” 
at some level of the monitoring pyramid). Failures to resolve participation frictions, although less 
discussed, are equally important. They are a routine occurrence in the less-developed financial 
systems and justify much of the state’s catalytic and financial infrastructure-building role. But 
they may also happen in well-developed systems, particularly in the process of spreading risk.
11 
 
  The second type of finance malady does not come from the financial system’s inability to 
reduce frictions. Instead, it is the apparently successful financial development ensuing from a 
reduction of agency and participation frictions—a process that is typically boosted by 
innovation—that itself may endogenously lead to problems of instability and unsustainability. 
Thus, FD may often take place in a fragile or even self-destructive mode that is in conflict with 
financial stability—this endogenous outcome is what we define as the “dark side of finance.” 
 
  The dark side of finance has three basic modes. In the first mode, the successful easing of 
agency frictions is, paradoxically, at the source of the problem. It can trigger lethal collective 
action failures. For example, the availability of public information and the associated reduction 
in the ability to appropriate the rents from private information encourage investors to free ride. 
Instead of staying put and investing in monitoring, they may rather invest short and rely on 
market liquidity to exit at the first sign of possible trouble.
12 But the easing of agency frictions 
can also trigger a second round of agency failures, much as building more highways can 
exacerbate congestion by increasing traffic. As shown in the global crisis, the rising reliance on 
third party monitors, coupled with the ease of exit, can give rise to a complex and opaque chain 
of transactions, where agents have little or no “skin in the game.”
13  
 
In the second mode of the dark side, the successful easing of collective action frictions on 
account of rising participation is, again paradoxically, what triggers the problems. The positive 
externalities of increased market participation in good times turn into crippling negative 
externalities and other collective action failures in bad times. While market participation is a 
“win-win” situation for all, as it enhances depth and liquidity, it also widens the scope for un-
internalized externalities, coordination failures, and free riding problems. For example, agents 
may take positions expecting to free-ride on market liquidity—i.e., expecting to unwind their 
positions if needed at little or no cost. But market withdrawals in times of stress can unleash 
negative externalities as they may be individually optimal but socially harmful because of the 
systemic implications of fire sale spirals and self-fulfilling collapses in liquidity.
14 To the extent 
that agents do not internalize these externalities, they will take excessive risk (from a social 
viewpoint) in the tranquil times.  
 
In either case, problems arise from significant wedges between private and social costs 
and benefits, which markets on their own are simply unable to handle. Instead, the financial 
activities individuals engage in as self-protection for the good times may no longer work in the 
                                                 
11 This is the main theme discussed in Anginer, de la Torre and Ize (2011).    
12 Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that the dark side of bank wholesale funding dominates when bank assets are 
more arm’s length and tradable. 
13 See Aschcraft and Schuerman (2008) and Gorton and Metrick (2010). 
14 See Shleifer and Vishny (2011). 8 
 
bad times. For example, insuring oneself by selling risk to others (through, say, credit default 
swaps) can actually raise systemic fragility through interconnected risk and lead to contagion and 
accentuated downward spirals in bad times, when default risk becomes highly correlated and the 
value of collateral collapses. Or else rising participation along the intensive dimension (the same 
intermediaries engaging in more transactions and becoming financial giants) can boost social 
moral hazard by vastly increasing the social costs of individual institution failures through the 
too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail syndromes. 
 
The dark side has yet a third mode in which the successful reduction of agency or 
participation frictions leads to problems of collective cognition. The bonanza associated with FD 
feeds a collective mood of optimism that puts the system on a disequilibrium path. This is 
typically amplified by financial innovations (for example, securitization) that unleash bouts of 
exuberance, even if the full implications of the innovations are not well understood. The mood 
swings first accentuate the upswing; once the market sentiment switches and euphoria turns into 
despair, they worsen the collapse.
15 
 
3.         The empirics of financial development 
 
a.  Data and methodology 
 
We now proceed to conduct a simple empirical analysis of aggregate FD indicators. Our 
aim is to illustrate the above conceptual framework by showing that the order of appearance of 
various financial activities and the path they follow as they develop validate, at least broadly, the 
linkages and dynamics described in the previous section. We measure domestic financial 
development based on a battery of indicators that include:
16 
 
  Key components of commercial banks’ operations (deposit and non-deposit funding, 
credit to the private sector, claims on other domestic financial institutions); 
  Insurance companies premia (life and non-life); 
  Mutual funds and pension funds assets; 
  Public and private debt securities (domestic and external capitalization);  
  Domestic equity market capitalization. 
  Domestic equity market turnover 
  The share of fee-based income in total banking income 
  Banks’ net interest margin; 
 
To reflect cross-border finance, we use two financial globalization indicators: 
 
  Gross country external debt (claims and liabilities); 
                                                 
15 The importance of mood swings for financial bubbles and panics finds its roots in Keynes’s animal spirits and 
Hyman Minsky’s writings on financial crises (see Minsky 1975). More recently, it was popularized by Kindleberger 
(1989) and Shiller (2006).  
16 The data are from FinStats 2009, a world-wide financial database put together by the World Bank, which covers 
40 key financial indicators for the period 1980-2008 (coverage quality varies between variables). The data come 
from a variety of sources including IFS, BIS, WDI, S&P, Bankscope, Axco, and national sources. 9 
 
  Gross country external equity (claims and liabilities). 
 
Finally, we include four bank soundness indicators: 
 
  Leverage (the unweighted capital to assets ratio); 
  Capital adequacy (the risk-weighted capital to assets ratio); 
  Profitability (returns on assets); 
  Liquidity (the share of liquid assets into total bank assets). 
 
To make the data as comparable as possible across countries, we control for economic 
development (based on the level and square of GDP per capita) as well as various other factors 
that can be considered to be exogenous (at least in the short-term) to FD policy and the FD 
process itself, including:
17 population (size, density, young and old dependency ratios) and 
country-specific characteristics (fuel exporter, offshore financial center, transition country). 
 
  To better capture the underlying FD patterns, we employ quantile (median) regressions, 
which are less influenced by outliers. Moreover, rather than undergoing a panel estimate, which 
would blend variations across countries and across time, we conduct our analysis in two stages. 
In the first stage, we take the medians for each country of its FD indicators over the whole 
sample period and then conduct a cross-section estimate over the medians. In a second stage, we 
compare this cross-section aggregate development path, which serves as a benchmark, with the 
individual, dynamic development paths followed by specific country groupings, grouped by 
initial income levels and by regions.   
 
b.  The patterns 
 
The results on three key patterns—order of appearance, convexity, and returns to scale—
are displayed in Figure 2, where activities are ordered by the per capita income level at which 
they appear.
18 Financial activities that are the least prone to frictions emerge and develop first.  
Activities that are subject to strong frictions require more time. Some activities (such as debt and 
equity securities markets) are strongly boosted by scale and network effects, which accentuate 
the convexity of the development paths after some threshold level of friction reduction is 
reached.  The main stylized patterns that emerge from the econometric analysis of the available 
data are discussed in what follows. 
 
Government borrowing. It emerges the earliest in the game (Figure 2), as governments 
are the first to overcome elementary frictions. But given the smallness of financial markets at 
low levels of economic development, government borrowing takes place initially abroad and in 
                                                 
17 The controls were selected iteratively, based on individual statistical significance and collective explanatory 
power. 
18 The level of GDP per capita at which financial services start to appear is measured by the intercept of the cross-
section paths for the main depth indicators with the horizontal axis. To limit lower tail distortions when a non-linear 
fit is imposed on the data we only use for these estimates a linear per capita GDP term. Convexity is measured by 
the coefficient of quadratic per-capita GDP when the financial depth indicators are regressed against both per-capita 
GDP and its square. Scale effects are measured by the coefficient of population size in the controlled regressions. 10 
 
foreign currency.
19 External public debt declines as per capita income rises and is replaced by 
domestic debt (Figure 3). Remarkably, the latter is a big outlier as regard the predicted 
correlation between order of appearance and returns to scale. Although domestic debt faces large 
returns to scale (implying a large size threshold and significant collective action frictions), it 
appears at a relatively early stage. This suggests that governments are willing to pay a premium 
arguably not just to meet their financing needs but also because government debt markets are a 
public good that helps conduct monetary policy or develop private debt and derivative markets. 
In addition, domestic public debt follows an S-shaped path, as solvency constraints eventually 
limit its size relative to GDP (Figure 3).   
 
Banking services. They come next (Figure 2). Retail funding (bank deposits) emerges 
before credit. Bank deposit services initially expand in response to the early need for simple 
custodial and payment services. But banks have a harder time lending than attracting funds. As 
information gathering moves from relationship-based lending to arms-length finance, private 
credit rises along a convex path—it catches up with deposits over time and eventually exceeds 
retail funding as wholesale (non-deposit) funding makes up for the slack (Figure 4). Lending to 
other financial institutions follows private credit and is highly convex. These features are all 
related. As frictions ease up, retail investors are increasingly able to shift into higher yielding 
market instruments or to have their funds managed by asset managers or institutional investors 
rather than banks.  At the same time, banks increasingly lend to each other.
20 The high convexity 
of these activities reflects the reduction of collective action frictions associated with rising 
participation (more players and same players engaging in more activity) and denser finance.   
 
  Capital markets. They come after banking (Figure 2). Private debt securities follow 
equity. The late appearance of capital markets and the strong convexity of their development 
paths are of course clear manifestations of the complexity of both agency and collective action 
frictions. Remarkably, private (market) debt is another big outlier. It emerges late in the game 
despite limited returns to scale. This suggests that, unlike in the case of public debt whose 
growth is primarily constrained by critical mass effects, the growth of private debt is limited by 
information and enforcement frictions rather than by returns to scale-collective action frictions. 
On the other hand, the fact that corporate bonds develop after stocks is arguably because growing 




  Institutional investors. They appear at very different stages of FD. Pension funds emerge 
early, mutual funds late; insurance arises somewhere in between, with non-life emerging earlier 
                                                 
19 This is of course the basic premise of the original sin literature, which focuses on the inability of emerging 
economy sovereigns and corporates to issue long-term domestic currency-denominated debt.  For the relevant 
analysis and suggestions for “redemption” see, for example, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999); Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002); Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002); and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005).  The fact that the 
better foreign institutional framework facilitates enforcement is an important component of the “original sin” story 
(see de la Torre and Schmukler, 2004).  
20 The high convexity of wholesale funding and interbank lending can be viewed as the growth analog of the rapid 
rise of wholesale funding and bank interconnectedness.  See Shin (2010). 
21 The fact that equity markets have an unlimited upside may also contribute to explain their earlier appearance even 
under high agency frictions. 11 
 
than life. That pension funds appear early reflects the key role played by policy, in the form of 
pension reforms. That mutual funds appear late despite not facing increasing returns to scale (i.e., 
not being constrained by market size) reflects the fact that the marketable, liquid assets—which 
mutual funds need to invest in—appear relatively late in the game. The later appearance of life 
over non-life insurance follows the same logic. The early emergence of non-life insurance is in 
part because it is influenced by policy, in the form of mandatory insurance for motor vehicles; 
the late appearance of life insurance can be explained by the later development of capital markets 
on which it depends.
22 Reflecting the need to invest in marketable assets and for life cohorts to 
interact inter-generationally, life insurance takes time to bloom; but once it does, it follows a 
steeply convex path. 
 
c.  The paths 
 
  Development paths are unlikely to be unique, i.e., the lower-income countries of today 
are unlikely to exactly retrace the path followed yesterday by the higher-income countries. There 
are a number of reasons why this might be the case. A first reason is country-specific policies 
and institutional settings. FD is faster and deeper in countries that have better policies or stronger 
institutions. A second reason is path dependence, which results from the fact that output growth 
is itself a function of financial development. Thus, because today’s financial development 
depends on today’s output, which in turn depends on yesterday’s financial development, initial 
conditions matter. Thus, initially better institutional rules and arrangements can become self-
reinforcing.
23 A third reason is leapfrogging. It most likely results from financial innovations that 
are easily transferable across borders; therefore, it affects those financial services that do not rely 
too heavily on (non-tradable) local institutions.
24 A fourth reason is financial crashes that leave 
enduring scars in the FD process. A fifth and final reason is endogenous quantum jumps in FD at 
the higher end of the income scale.  
 
To unscramble these effects we separate countries into four groups according to their 
initial per capita income (low, lower middle, higher middle, high) and plot the year-by-year 
medians for each of the groups, together with the underlying cross-section path obtained by 
averaging data over the whole period for which it is available. Given that incomes grow over 
time, they provide the general direction of movement. Hence, the year-by-year medians provide 
a reasonable proxy for the underlying dynamic paths.
25 The results are summarized in Figures 5 
to 8. Key features worth noting are as follows: 
 
                                                 
22 The abnormally low (negative) returns to scale of casualty insurance reflect the predominance of foreign trade 
insurance in the small open economies. It accounts for a disproportionally high share of total casualty insurance, 
reflecting the importance of foreign trade for these economies. See Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011).      
23 See North (1990).  
24 Consider, for example, the cases of credit card services and e-banking. These services are now found in most 
developing countries and, while they may cover a small fraction of the adult population, they work with comparable 
functionality and quality as in rich countries. In both cases, developing countries have been able to leapfrog because 
the associated technology is relatively easy to import and adapt, and the services do not heavily depend on local 
contractual institutions. 
25 The correlation between time and per-capita income for the world as a whole is 0.82. Except for the early eighties 
and the early nineties, per-capita income grew smoothly during the rest of the sample period.  12 
 
1)  With a few exceptions (public debt and non-life insurance), the dynamic paths followed 
by all financial depth indicators in the higher income countries cross the cross-section 
paths from below, suggesting quantum jumps in financial development at the higher end 
of the income scale. Similar features appear for financial globalization and the equity 
market turnover. Such an “explosion” of financial activity suggests that, once countries 
reach some stage of economic and financial development, interconnectedness and 
network effects become so high as to “ignite” a secondary chain-reaction of financial 
activity, both inside and across countries.
26  
 
2)  However, for several depth indicators, including bank deposits, life insurance premia, 
pension fund assets and domestic public debt, the dynamic paths followed by the lower 
income countries also cross the cross-section paths from below, suggesting the presence 
of leap frogging effects. Leap frogging is also detectable for the equity market turnover at 
the lowest end of the income scale, as well as for banking margins for all income levels 
except at the top. In the case of pension funds and domestic debt, such leap frogging is 
likely to be mostly policy-induced. However, for bank deposits and bank margins it is 
likely to reflect the diffusion of technological innovations. In the case of bank margins, 
innovations affect all countries across the income scale, except those at the top where the 
already narrow margins limit the scope for further gains. 
 
3)  Some indicators, notably private credit and wholesale funding for the low and middle 
income countries, exhibit clear cyclical paths of booms and busts, suggesting that for 
these countries financial development was hardly a smooth process (more on this below). 
Should those countries not have been hit by such crises, it is apparent from the stark, V-
shaped recovery of private credit after the bust (crossing the cross-section path at a sharp 
angle) that both sides of their banking intermediation (deposits as well as credit) would 
have similarly benefitted from innovation-induced leap frogging.  
 
4)  The cross-section path for the ratio of fee income to interest income is U-shaped, 
suggesting that early banks as well as mature banks rely less on intermediation. For the 
former, it is because they cannot lend, for the latter because competition with capital 
markets and other intermediaries (reflecting the overcoming of both agency and 
collective action frictions in mature financial systems) induces them to rely increasingly 
on fees from market services rather than on interest income from traditional 
intermediation. 
 
  4.  What explains financial development successes and gaps? 
 
a.   The policy variables 
 
                                                 
26 Note however that is also possible for at least part of this financial explosion to be itself a direct reflection of the 
forces of the dark side, i.e., to be a bubble linked with collective cognition problems or economic rent extraction 
rather than value added production. Indeed, many commentators (for instance, Haldane, 2010, or Turner, 2010) have 
suggested that the pre-crisis explosion of finance in the high-income countries was precisely driven by such 
dynamics.  13 
 
How can financial development successes and gaps relative to benchmark be explained? 
Is it due to demand effects, supply effects, or the lasting impact of past financial turbulence? To 
address these issues, we add policy controls to the regressions of financial development 
indicators (FDIs) and test the impact of credit crashes on financial development. More 
specifically:  
 
  On the demand side, we add past output growth, as a proxy for the investment-related 
demand for loanable funds and equity (i.e., the supply of “bankable” projects).  
 
  On the supply side, we use four enabling environment indicators (EEIs), credit 
information
27, enforcement costs
 28, creditor rights
29 and property rights
30.   
 
  For financial turbulence, we define mild, strong and severe credit crashes as annual 
drops in private credit to GDP of 5 to 10 percent, 11to 20 percent and over 20 
percent, respectively.
31  To eliminate the effect of recurrent volatility, we also include 
in the regressions the standard deviation of normalized private credit.  
 
In all cases, we first filter these policy variables (effectively we also “benchmark” them) 
using the same set of controls as for FDIs. We then include the residuals as additional controls to 
explain financial development.  
 
b.  Results 
 
Table 2, which reports the results of the EEI benchmarking, provides revealing insights 
on how the underlying frictions that affect the development process are themselves affected by 
financial development. In particular, we find that the quality of the informational environment 
(as proxied by credit information) is concave but subject to scale effects. In contrast, the quality 
of the contractual environment (creditor and property rights) is convex but not subject to scale 
effects. 
  
This suggests that informational frictions are of a mostly technological nature. Because of 
fixed costs, they are easier to implement in larger countries. However they are solvable with 
adequate investments and ready-made imports from abroad. Moreover, once the required 
investments are in place, there are decreasing returns to further informational improvements as 
developmental levels rise. In contrast, contractual frictions cannot be solved by technological 
investments or imports. They are mostly institutional and reflect collective action frictions that 
                                                 
27 Source: Depth of Credit Information Index (Doing Business Indicators, World Bank) 
28 Source: we merge Number of Procedures, Time to Resolution, and Costs as percent of Claim into a single 
indicator using the first principal component (all three indices are from Doing Business Indicators, World Bank). 
29 Source: Strength of Legal Rights, Doing Business Indicators (World Bank). 
30 Source: Property Rights, Heritage Foundation. 
31 We depart from most of the crisis literature by studying multiple annual credit crashes instead of focusing on a 
“before and after analysis” based on financial crisis periods. All three crash variables are defined as the percentage 
of years a country experienced a given type of crash. We average all data for 2005-07 and add each crash variable 
separately to the regressions of private credit to GDP. 14 
 
are trickier to resolve, no matter how large the country. And the pay-offs from better institutions 
continue to rise with the level of economic development. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of adding the policy controls to the regressions, using the 
subset of FD indicators over which policy variables were found to have the most significant 
impacts. The results can be summarized as follows: 
 
  Enforcement costs affect bank credit, bank wholesale funding and the equity market 
turnover. The strong impact on banking is consistent with the presumption that 
collateral (hence the capacity to enforce) is vital to banking credit. The impact on the 
equity turnover may reflect the fact that better enforcement generally coincides with 
better corporate governance.  
 
  Credit information appears to be more of a mixed bag. It does not have much of an 
impact on banking but instead has a strong impact on domestic equity market 
turnover. While caveats of course apply (the lack of significance may simply reflect 
the limited quality of the indicator), this mixed result could suggest that while 
relationship lending and the use of collateral can remedy for informational problems 
in banking, informational frictions are more difficult to circumvent in the case of 
capital markets. 
 
  Creditor and property rights strongly affect the domestic equities market but do not 
seem to have much impact on banking depth; however, they enhance the profitability, 
solvency and liquidity of banks. The importance of contractual rights for the 
development of the equities market is obvious (contractual rights are also likely to be 
strongly correlated with governance). The fact that they also indirectly affect banking 
is somewhat more puzzling but broadly plausible: a better rule of law may promote 
the capitalization of banks by enhancing their profitability. 
 
  Past GDP growth strongly promotes bank credit while reducing the liquidity of bank 
assets. This confirms that demand effects have a first-order impact on banking depth 
indicators. The negative impact on liquidity is of course fully consistent with the 
positive impact on credit. 
 
  Credit crashes have a strong impact on banking depth (primarily credit but also 
funding), as well as on banks’ margins; they also have some negative impact on stock 
trading. That credit crashes induce banks to contract intermediation and raise their 
margins is of course hardly surprising. What is more remarkable, however, is that 
banks take a long time to recover.
32 It is also quite telling that it is credit crashes—but 
not volatility per se—that leave a substantial and lasting imprint on financial 
development. Interestingly, we also find that the probability of crashes increases as 
private credit “over-performs” over its benchmark (Table 4). This is a noteworthy 
                                                 
32 That banking intermediation takes a long time to recover from a crash can be readily inferred from the fact that we 
estimated the impact on current financial development of crises that happened over a thirty years time-span.   15 
 
reminder that financial development and financial stability interact in complex ways, 
reflecting the ever-present duality between the bright side and the dark side. 
  
  The fact that credit crashes and demand effects have such a strong impact on private 
credit while, once benchmarked (i.e., after accounting for endogeneities), supply side 
constraints only appear to have a more moderate impact is important to inform the 
policy trade-off debate between stability and development. While finance can 
certainly be improved through financial reforms, it ends up being highly dependent 
on high but sustainable economic growth. Good economic policies and sound 
prudential management are essential to financial development. 
 
5.  Final thoughts 
 
  This paper started from the premise that both the evolution of financial structure 
(financial development) and its sustainability (financial stability) are shaped by four fundamental 
types of frictions and their associated market failures and paradigms. Two such frictions restrict 
agents’ capacity to establish and enforce bilateral contracts (agency frictions) and the other two 
restrict agents’ capacity to participate and coordinate their financial activities in ways that are 
collectively desirable (collective frictions). The broad predictions derived from this approach 
regarding the order of appearance, returns to scale and shape of developmental paths of various 
financial activities turned out to be generally satisfied. In particular, where activities are mostly 
hindered by participation frictions, development paths exhibit substantial convexities, as rising 
participation and interconnectedness generate positive externalities that promote further 
participation and interconnectedness. Thus, much of financial development may be explosive.  
 
  The obvious counterpart of such explosiveness, however, is that the impact of financial 
development (measured for example as private credit to GDP) on real development (output 
growth) must necessarily exhibit decreasing returns. Unless the rate of income growth keeps 
accelerating as the level of income rises (a clear dynamic impossibility), the impact of finance on 
growth should necessarily level off at some point. This is exactly the conclusion that several 
recent papers reach when regressing output growth against financial depth indicators.
 33 In this 
sense, finance resembles a luxury good; its use explodes as income rises, yet its benefits 
(whether in welfare or growth) should naturally exhibit falling marginal returns. By itself, this 
does not necessarily imply that there can be “too much finance”. If one reasonably assumes non-
satiation, more finance should always be better. 
  
                                                 
33 Deidda and Fattouh (2002) find that FD has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on growth in 




levels of FD.  Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2011) find that finance actually starts having a negative effect on output 
growth when credit to the private sector exceeds 110 percent of GDP. This result is congenial to that in De Gregorio 
and  Guidotti (1995),  who  found  that  in  high  income  countries  FD was positively correlated with output 
growth during 1960‐1985 but that the correlation was negative in the 1970‐85 subperiod.   16 
 
  However, the same frictions that feed the developmental forces of the bright side also 
feed the forces of instability from the dark side, making them interact in complex and unexpected 
ways. If collective action failures become more problematic in denser and more interconnected 
financial systems, the dark side of finance may well increase in intensity as income rises. Even if 
the intensity remained constant, instead of rising, the declining marginal benefits of financial 
development should eventually fall below the (rising or constant) marginal costs of financial 
instability. If so, the conclusion that finance will at some point become excessive would become 
inescapable. But the balance between the marginal costs and marginal benefits of finance will 
ultimately depend on the quality (and cost) of the policy response, as better policies could 
simultaneously limit the risks (and costs) of financial instability. This puts an increasing 
premium on good policies that keep the forces of the dark side in check as financial development 
deepens.  
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Table 1. A Simple Typology of Paradigms 
        
  
Full information /      
Full rationality 
Incomplete information / 
Bounded rationality 
Bilateral focus  Costly Enforcement     
(CE) 
Asymmetric Information     
(AI) 
Multilateral focus  Collective Action       
(CA) 
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Table 2. Benchmarking Enabling Environment Indicators (EEIs) 
                 







Log GDP per capita     0.741  3.442***  -1.998  -20.37*** 
      (1.094)  (3.438)  (-1.416)  (-2.859) 
Log Squared GDP per capita  -0.0561  -0.164**  0.169*  1.837*** 
      (-1.236)  (-2.465)  (1.798)  (3.869) 
Log Population     -0.0852  0.500***  -0.0278  -0.355 
      (-1.333)  (5.164)  (-0.204)  (-0.542) 
Log Population density  0.0270  -0.142  0.257*  -0.622 
      (0.375)  (-1.317)  (1.671)  (-0.846) 
Log Age dependency ratio, young  0.101  0.245  1.025  -7.026 
      (0.158)  (0.262)  (0.790)  (-1.051) 
Log Age dependency ratio, old  -0.833***  0.295  0.881  8.690*** 
      (-3.155)  (0.777)  (1.634)  (2.933) 
Offshore dummy     -0.211  0.190  1.774**  10.42*** 
      (0.657)  (0.386)  (2.539)  (3.097) 
Transition dummy     -0.407  -0.0678  2.300***  -13.70*** 
      (-0.967)  (-0.104)  (2.623)  (-3.132) 
Fuel exporter dummy     -0.158  -0.993***  -0.780  -4.426 
      (-0.647)  (-2.675)  (-1.504)  (-1.723) 
Constant     -0.749  -15.14***  2.706  107.1** 
      (-0.194)  (-2.675)  (0.342)  (2.559) 
Observation     158  158  158  162 
Pseudo R2     0.211  0.392  0.233  0.501 
T-statistics in parentheses             
*** p <0.01; ** p<0.5, * p<0.1             
Note: Median regressions on cross-sectional averages for available data in the period 1980-2008. The 
contract enforcement index is the principal component of the following indicators from Doing Business: 
contract enforcement costs, number of days to enforce a contract (in logs), and number of procedures to 
enforce a contract. The creditor rights index and the credit information index are from Doing Business. 














































ENFORCEMENT  -4.6  -0.8  -4.1  -0.1  -4.7  -4.9  0.0  0.1    
   (3.7)***  (0.4)  (4.2)***  (0.2)  (4.5)***  (1.0)  (0.2)  (0.4)    
CREDITOR 
RIGHTS  2.1  0.8  -0.3  0.2  -1.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.1    
   (3.2)***  (0.8)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (2.0)**  (0.1)  (0.8)  (0.9)    
CREDIT 
INFORMATION  0.8  -2.8  -1.8  0.0  3.3  -2.0  0.0  0.1    
   (1.1)  (2.1)*  (2.8)**  (0.0)  (4.6)***  (0.6)  (0.4)  (0.4)    
PROPERTY 
RIGHTS  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.8  0.0  0.1    
   (-0.1)  (0.9)  (0.1)  (0.5)  (6.5)***  (2.2)**  (2.6)***  (3.0)***    
GDP GROWTH  7.1  0.6  1.0  -0.1              -1.5 
   (7.4)***  (0.4)  (1.1)  (0.1)              (1.7)* 
CREDIT CRASH  -111.3  -63.7  -55.4  27.0                
(5.1)***  (1.8)*  (3.7)***  (1.9)** 
 ADDITIONAL 
CONTROLS  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observation  118  118  118  88  103  103  117  127  100 
Pseudo R2  0.573  0.441  0.261  0.486  0.456  0.354  0.299  0.19  0.186 
T-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p <0.01; ** p<0.5, * p<0.1 
Note: Median regressions on cross-sectional averages for available data in the period 1980-2008. The contract enforcement index is the principal 
component of the following indicators from Doing Business: contract enforcement costs, number of days to enforce a contract (in logs), and 
number of procedures to enforce a contract. The creditor rights index and the credit information index are from Doing Business. The property 
rights index is from the Heritage Foundation. GDP growth is the average annual growth over the sample period. Credit Crash is the fraction of 
sample years in which a country experienced an annual decline in domestic private credit to GDP of 20 percent or more. The additional controls 
are GDP per capita (squared), population size and density, fuel exporter dummy, age dependency ratio, offshore financial center dummy, transition 
country dummy, and year-fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 4. Impact of Credit Crashes on Credit Gap with Respect to its Benchmark 
           
   5% Credit Crash  10 % Credit Crash  20 % Credit Crash 
 
Pre-crash credit residual  1.038***       
   (0.0124)       
Pre-crash credit growth  0.125***       
   (0.101)       
Pre-crash credit residual     1.074***    
      (0.0163)    
Pre-crash credit growth     0.222**    
      (0.148)    
Pre-crash credit residual        1.132*** 
         (0.0320) 
Pre-crash credit growth        0.309 
        
(0.241) 
 
Observations  878  731  426 
Number of events  78  65  37 
z-statistics in parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
Note: Logit estimations with country-fixed effects. Odds ratios are presented. A x% credit crash is 
defined as an x% annual drop in domestic private credit to GDP. Growth variables are calculated using 5-
year window moving averages. Pre-crash credit growth deviation is T-1 to T-3 growth minus T-6 to T-3 





















Figure 1. Frictions, Paradigms, and Failures 
 

































































Figure 2. Appearance, Convexity, and Returns to Scale of FD Indicator Paths  
 
 
Note: Appearance is the level of GDP per capita at which financial services start to appear is as captured 
by the intercept estimated in a cross-sectional regression of 1980-2008 averages with the dependent 
variable in question and GDP per capita. Convexity is measured by the coefficient of quadratic per capita 
GDP in the workhorse regression. Scale effects are measured by the coefficient of population size in the 
workhorse regression. The workhorse median regression cross-sectional model regresses the financial 
indicator of interest on: GDP per capita (squared), population size and density, fuel exporter dummy, age 

















































































































































































































































































Appearance Convexity Returns to Scale26 
 
Figure 3. Paths for Government Debt: External and Domestic 
 
Note: First, a cross-sectional regression model is estimated on country averages, controlling for GDP per 
capita (squared), population size and density, young and old age dependency ratios, a financial offshore 
center dummy, a transition country dummy, and a large fuel exporter dummy. Then the variables are 
filtered. The filtering consists in removing from the actual country observations the expected 
contributions of all factors except GDP per capita, using the cross-sectional estimates from the above 
model. To account for non-linearities of GDP per capita in the cross-sectional regression, a 4-knot spline 



























Log of GDP per capita
Oustanding Domestic Public Debt Securities/GDP
Oustanding International Public Debt Securities/GDP27 
 
Figure 4. Banking Indicators' Paths: Retail and Wholesale Funding and Private Credit 
 
Note: First, a cross-sectional regression model is estimated on country averages, controlling for 
GDP per capita (squared), population size and density, young and old age dependency ratios, a 
financial offshore center dummy, a transition country dummy, and a large fuel exporter dummy. 
Then the variables are filtered. The filtering consists in removing from the actual country 
observations the expected contributions of all factors except GDP per capita, using the cross-
sectional estimates from the above model. To account for non-linearities of GDP per capita in the 
cross-sectional regression, a 4-knot spline approach is used. The filtered variables are then 















































Figure 5a. Financial Depth Indicators: Dynamic and Cross-Section Development Paths 
 
DMB Domestic Deposits / GDP (IFS)  Non-Deposit Funding / GDP (IFS) 
 
Private Credit / GDP (IFS)
 
DMB Claims on the Domestic Non-Monetary 
Financial Sector / GDP (IFS) 
 
Insurance Premiums (Non-Life) /GDP (AXCO) Insurance Premium (Life) / GDP (AXCO) 
 
 
Note: First, a cross-sectional regression model is estimated on country averages, controlling for GDP per capita 
(squared), population size and density, young and old age dependency ratios, a financial offshore center dummy, a 
transition country dummy, and a large fuel exporter dummy. Annual country residuals are derived from the cross-
sectional estimates which are used to calculate annual country-group medians. The charts plot annual country-group 
medians of the filtered variables against the logarithm of GDP per capita. The filtering consists in removing from the 
actual annual country observations the expected contributions of all factors except GDP per capita, using the cross-
sectional estimates from the above model. To account for nonlinearities of GDP per capita in the cross-sectional 
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Figure 5b. Financial Depth Indicators: Dynamic and Cross-Section Development Paths 
 
Mutual Fund Assets / GDP (NBFI)  Pension Fund Assets / GDP (NBFI) 
  
Outstanding Domestic Private Debt Securities 
/ GDP (BIS) 
Outstanding International Private Debt 
Securities / GDP (BIS) 
  
Outstanding Domestic Public Debt Securities / 
GDP (BIS) 
Outstanding International Public Debt 
Securities / GDP (BIS) 
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Figure 5c. Financial Depth Indicators: Dynamic and Cross-Section Development Paths 
 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP (S&P)  Stock Market Turnover Ratio (S&P) 
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Figure 6. Financial Globalization Indicators: Dynamic and Cross-Section Paths 
Gross Portfolio Debt Liabilities / GDP (IFS)  Gross Portfolio Debt Assets / GDP (IFS) 
Gross Portfolio Equity Liabilities / GDP (IFS)  Gross Portfolio Equity Assets / GDP (IFS) 
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Figure 7. Financial Efficiency and Liquidity Indicators: Dynamic and Cross-Section Paths 
 
Net Interest Margin (Bankscope)  Stock Market Turnover Ratio (S&P) 
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Figure 8. Banking Non -Interest income to Total income 
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